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SYMPOSIUM
WORLD TRADE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND THE GLOBAL t LITES:
AN INTRODUCTION
Peter K. Yu*
Traditionally, intellectual property lawmaking is a matter of
domestic affairs. Without external interference, governments
make value judgments as to what would best promote the creation
and dissemination of intellectual works in their own countries.
Combined together, these disparate judgments form an intellectual
property system that is tailored to the country's level of wealth,
economic structure, technological capability, political system, and
cultural tradition.
To protect authors and inventors, governments sometimes
need to make adjustments to their intellectual property systems in
exchange for better protection abroad. In those scenarios, policy-
makers often evaluate the adjustments carefully to make sure that
they correspond to the country's socio-economic conditions, re-
search and development capabilities, and institutional and budget-
ary constraints. Thus, most bilateral and multilateral intellectual
property treaties tend to focus on a limited range of issues. Even
when they seek to harmonize protection by creating international
minimum standards, these treaties are designed with such flexibil-
ity that allows governments "wiggle room" to develop their own
intellectual property systems.
However, with increasing globalization and the establishment
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the control of national
governments over the adoption and implementation of domestic
intellectual property laws has been greatly reduced. Indeed, inter-
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national lawmaking has begun to replace country-based assess-
ments and domestic policymaking as the predominant mode of
intellectual property lawmaking. Through a global process, gov-
ernments collectively design an international intellectual property
system that takes into consideration the diverging interests, histo-
ries, cultures, and traditions of the various members of the interna-
tional community.1
Undeniably, international lawmaking ensures greater harmo-
nization of intellectual property laws among countries with differ-
ent conditions, needs, and aspirations. A harmonized regime not
only would create certainty and predictability for those engaged in
making investment, research, and licensing decisions, but also
would prevent "races to the bottom" in which countries compete to
attract and retain business investment by lowering their regulatory
standards.2 In addition, by encouraging participation in collective
decisionmaking, the international lawmaking process allows mem-
bers of the international community to coordinate their intellectual
property systems and to resolve disputes and differences in a cost-
efficient manner. This process also encourages cooperation, pro-
motes the rule of law, and fosters stability in the international
system.
Nonetheless, international lawmaking has limited effective-
ness in countries that lack a well-functioning judicial system and
the needed enforcement infrastructure.3 It also might undermine
the ability of less developed countries to compete in the global
economy. Very often, the "universal templates" created in the in-
ternational lawmaking process are modeled after laws in developed
countries and fail to take into consideration the socio-economic
1 See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994);
WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/94 (Dec. 23,
1996); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc.
CRNR/DC/95 (Dec. 23, 1996).
2 See John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114
HARV. L. REV. 511, 551-52 (2000).
3 See Robert M. Sherwood, Some Things Cannot Be Legislated, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L
& COMP. L. __ (2002); see also Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellec-
tual Property in China in the Twenty-first Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 213-21 (2000)




conditions of less developed countries.4 Thus, by requiring coun-
tries to adopt "universal" standards, international lawmaking
might deprive less developed countries of the ability to tailor their
intellectual property systems to local conditions.
Even worse, the international lawmaking process has become
increasingly vulnerable to influences from multinational corpora-
tions, trade associations, and value-driven interest groups.5 The re-
sulting laws also have ignored such important issues as consumer
interests, national sovereignty, cultural diversity, ecological sus-
tainability, and human rights. Moreover, as commentators pointed
out, the existing global trading institutions suffer from some basic
structural defects. In the case of the WTO, these defects include
the lack of transparency of the institution, limited access by non-
members to the dispute settlement bodies, technical and financial
difficulties confronting less developed countries in their implemen-
tation of the treaty obligations, the insensitivity and undemocratic
nature of the decisionmaking process, and the lack of accountabil-
ity of policymakers to the global citizenry.6
These criticisms became even more important in light of the
recent anti-globalization protests in Seattle, Washington, Prague,
Quebec, and Genoa.7 Against a background of colonial and semi-
colonial history, less developed countries begin to develop resent-
ment toward developed countries and multinational corporations.
4 Assafa Endeshaw, The Paradox of Intellectual Property Lawmaking in the New Mil-
lennium: Universal Templates as Terms of Surrender for Non-industrial Nations; Piracy as
an Offshoot, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. - (2002).
5 See Susan K. Sell, Industry Strategies for Intellectual Property and Trade: The Quest
for TRIPS and Post-TRIPS Strategies, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. - (2002) (argu-
ing that U.S.-based corporate actors were largely responsible for the TRIPs Agreement
and highlighting their political strategies before, during, and after the adoption of the
Agreement); see also U.S. Industries, Trade Associations, and Intellectual Property Law-
making, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. - (2002).
6 For sources discussing the structural defects of the World Trade Organization, see
Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach to Resolving Global Intellectual Property
Disputes: What We Can Learn from Mediators, Business Strategists, and International Rela-
tions Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. pt. I.B (forthcoming 2002).
7 For discussions of the failed Seattle Ministerial Conference, see generally Frederick
M. Abbott, TRIPS in Seattle: The Not-So-Surprising Failure and the Future of the TRIPS
Agenda, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 165 (2000); David A. Gantz, Failed Efforts to Initiate the
"Millennium Round" in Seattle: Lessons for Future Global Trade Negotiations, 17 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMp. L. 349 (2000); Renato Ruggiero, Reflections After Seattle, 24 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 9 (2000); Clyde Summers, The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and
Societal Values, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 61 (2001); Susan Tiefenbrun, Free Trade and
Protectionism: The Semiotics of Seattle, 17 ARIZ. J. ITr'L & COMP. L. 257 (2000).
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Eventually, this resentment might spill over to the international in-
tellectual property system and other trade-related areas, thus creat-
ing a legitimacy crisis within the international trading system.
Alarmed by recent developments in international trade and the
failure of the Seattle Ministerial Conference, commentators high-
light the need for a better understanding of international trading
institutions and the lawmaking process. 8 Some have even put for-
ward proposals for reforming the international trading system.9
Despite the importance of intellectual property to the global
economy, legal scholars and political scientists rarely analyze the
international intellectual property lawmaking process.' ° To fill this
void, we bring together policymakers, legal scholars, practitioners,
industry people, political scientists, economists, and development
specialists to discuss this important issue. What follows are the pa-
pers and remarks delivered at the "World Trade, Intellectual Prop-
erty, and the Global Elites: International Lawmaking in the New
Millennium" Symposium, which was held at the Benjamin N. Car-
dozo School of Law, Yeshiva University on March 7, 2001. It is our
hope that this symposium will create a dialogue that enriches our
understanding of the international intellectual property system, the
process of harmonization, and the role and impact of intergovern-
mental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational corpora-
tions, and trade associations in international intellectual property
lawmaking.
8 See, e.g., McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 2; Robert W. McGee, Legal Ethics,
Business Ethics and International Trade: Some Neglected Issues, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. - (2002); Michael P. Ryan, Knowledge-Economy Elites, the International Law
of Intellectual Property and Trade, and Economic Development, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. - (2002); Paul B. Stephan, Institutions and Elites: Property, Contract, the State,
and Rights in Information in the Global Economy, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
(2002).
9 For reform proposals in the intellectual property area, see, for example, Gail E. Ev-
ans, On Why the WTO Needs a Social Chapter: The Case for Putting Intellectual Property
and Socio-economic Rights Together, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. __ (2002); Doris
Estelle Long, "Democratizing" Globalization: Practicing the Policies of Cultural Inclusion,
10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. - (2002).
10 For discussions of the international intellectual property lawmaking process, see, for
example, MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE
POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1998); SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS:
NORTH-SouTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST (1998); Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, The Integration of International and Domestic Intellectual Property Lawmak-
ing, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 307 (2000).
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Speeches
On March 7, 2001 The Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
held a symposium entitled World Trade Intellectual Property and
the Global Elites: International Lawmaking in the New Millen-
nium. The following speeches, presented by Jacques Gorlin, Ger-
alyn Ritter, Shira Perlmutter, Eric H. Smith and Robert Stoll
touched upon the issue of U.S. Industries, Trade Associations, and
Intellectual Property Lawmaking. They are included below.
The symposium also addressed the issue of Private Sectors,
Public Interests, and International Intellectual Property Regime
and a speech made by Robert Sherwood is included as well. Fol-
lowing these speeches are articles submitted by Doris E. Long,
Robert W. McGee, Susan K. Sell, Paul B. Stephan, III, Michael P.
Ryan and Assafa Endeshaw, all presenters at the symposium.
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Thank you very much, and thank you for inviting me to this
symposium.
First of all, let me say that I share Susan [Sell]'s position. Fur-
thermore, I am not a lawyer even though I am speaking here in a
law school about an international agreement. And, I do not want
to take a legal perspective.
In fact, I will try to stay away from the substance. However I
do want to make one or two points. The biggest problem that
those of us who were involved in the take off of TRIPS is that,
after the TRIPS agreement went into effect, the lawyers took over.
Most of us who have a background, not in intellectual prop-
erty, but in trade, looked at the TRIPS agreement not so much as a
legal instrument but as more of a political document that included
minimum standards of intellectual property protection. That is, to
the extent that the agreement is enforced, it is as much a political
